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web - Why is script-src-elem not using values from script-src as a fallback?

When implementing csp-header, I have specified my policy as: default-src 'self'; script-src www.gstatic.com; Since I have not declared script-src-elem directive in my csp policy, as stated in this mdn documentation, I was expecting policy defined for script-src to be used for script-src-elem directive as well. However, I see violation being reported as "viloated-directive":"script-src-elem" "blocked-uri":"https://www.gstatic.com/blah/blah".

Any idea why this behavior is happening?

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After seeing this exact same pattern in some of my applications, I finally got to the root of this!

The weirdness we were seeing was that CSP reports were coming in for a hostname which was definitely in the script-src directive; and we know that script-src-elem is supposed to fall back to those directives. From that perspective, it should have been literally impossible for these reports to happen.

Here's what we found: the users these reports were coming from were using the PrivacyBadger browser extension, which was leading to false positive CSP reports for the hosts (Google) that it blocked. I didn't dig too far into it, but here's my theory on how that happens:

  1. The Content Security Policy performs a pre-request check for the JavaScript include on the page (eg. gstatic.com or google-analytics.com). The pre-request check passes, because the hostname is allowed in the policy.
  2. The browser initiates a request for the resource
  3. PrivacyBadger intercepts the request via the browser's onBeforeRequest API (see PrivacyBadger source and Chrome documentation)
  4. ProvacyBadger returns a surrogate data blob for the asset. It does this to ensure that code which relies on the real javascript (eg. window.ga) won't break.
  5. The browser then performs a post-request check against the returned base64 blob
  6. The post-request check fails - because the policy does not allow data: for script-src
  7. The browser sends a CSP report for the blocked asset.

This seems like it might be a browser bug - because the report reflects the original asset's third party hostname; while the blocked content is actually a data: blob that was returned via the intercepted request.


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